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CHAPTER EIGHT

THE SUPREME COURT AS A VANGUARD

Six decades passed between the Terrett case and the first ruling
based on the First Amendment's religion clauses in the Reynolds case.
Another six decades passed before the Supreme Court began applying these
clauses specifically to state and local issues.

When the Court finally

did so in 1940, its caseload increased dramatically and its
interpretation of their provisions underwent a profound change.
The years from 1940 to 1948 represent a constitutional watershed in
the relationship between church and state, marking a transition between
the Court's role as a guardian of the traditional religious values and
its more active role in the vanguard of a new religious consensus.

But

it is not clear that the Court has led the change so much as it has
simply articulated some of the political, technological, and cultural
trends that were already transforming the constitutional system.

In

political as well as religious pronouncements, the customary invocation
of sacred truths in times past gradually yielded to an apotheosis of an
increasingly secular pluralism.

The Court at most provided a deus ex

machina for reconciling competing political demands and removing
sensitive religious issues from the political arena.
The stage was set for this a renewed judicial activism by the
Court's incorporation of the religious liberty guarantees of the First
Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment protections against state
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interference.

Apart from the expansion of its jurisdiction, it was the

Court's broader vision of the scope of the religion clauses that most
characterized the change.

But what the definition of religion gained in

breadth it lost in precision.
Before 1940, the Court rarely distinguished between the two
provisions of the First Amendment, which together read: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.

Before 1947, it did not even hint that

"

there might be an inherent conflict or incompatibility between them.
They were treated as a unit.

Yet a year later, the Court used the

establishment clause for the first time as a basis for ruling a law
unconstitutional.

As a consequence, the religious complexion of public

education soon began to be radically altered.
Since 1815, the Supreme Court has handed down some 130 separate
decisions on issues of church and state.

Nearly a quarter of these are

establishment cases involving schools, most of which have been decided
since 1962.

But this series of school cases was preceded by more than

two dozen free exercise cases involving a single denomination--the
Jehovah's Witnesses--over a period of roughly two decades from 1937
through 1955.

These cases straddle the transition between the Court's

custodial and activist periods.

They faithfully record the doctrinal

and personal struggles that marked the change and have typified the
Court's rulings ever since.

The Free Exercise Clause
The free exercise clause was the first of the religion clauses to
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be adopted specifically into the Court's catalog of rights guaranteed
under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The major portion of the early free

exercise cases decided under the new rule involved door-to-door
canvassing and public assemblies.

By the 1960s, however, the Court's

attention had shifted to issues concerning conscientious objection.
Some of the cases examined in this first section have counterparts
in the section on the establishment clause.

The seven church property

cases and the two religious test cases could easily be handled in either
section, but all of them--with the exception of a case involving church
tax exemptions--are included in the first section.

Moreover, parallels

between the two sets are especially evident in the school cases and the
Sunday law cases, most of which are included in the establishment
section.
For the sake of simplicity and convenience, cases decided after
1979 are left for the discussion of fiscal, educational, and social
issues in the chapters that follow.

Circulars and Solicitors

The Jehovah's Witnesses pioneered in the wedding of religious
proselytism to the latest communications technology.
phonographs and sound trucks figure in several cases.

Their portable
An offshoot of

the nineteenth century millenial Adventist movement, the sect had been
founded by Charles Taze Russell, a Pennsylvania haberdasher, and was at
that time under the leadership of Judge Joseph Rutherford.

1

Members of

the sect, all of whom were considered ministers, found themselves
continually running afoul a battery of municipal police regulations in
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scattered communities throughout the country.

The early Mormon cases

had been confined to a single region under federal territorial
jurisdiction, but almost all of the Jehovah's Witnesses cases, by
contrast, involved state laws and local ordinances.
The first two times the Court fully considered the issues raised by
the sect, it made no reference to the religious clauses.

In Lovell v.

City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), the unanimous Court ruled
unconstitutional a local ordinance in Georgia prohibiting the
distribution of circulars within city limits without the permission of
the city manager.

But in a similar case that raised only a free

exercise issue, Coleman v. City of Griffin, 302 U.S. 636 (1937), the
Court had dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal
question because it raised only a free exercise issue.

The Lovell case

was instead based on the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech
and press, which had already been incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment protections.

Referring to John Milton's famous "Appeal for

the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing,'' Chief Justice Hughes noted that
"liberty of the press became initially a right to publish 'without a
license what formerly could be published only with one'" (303 U.S. 444,
451).
A year later, in Schneider v. New Jersey (Town of Irvington), 308
U.S. 147 (1939), the Court overturned on the same basis a similar
ordinance requiring canvassers to obtain a permit from the chief of
police, holding that the authority to prevent littering could not be
used to suppress the circulation of handbills.

Although frauds may be

punished and trespasses forbidden, it declared that a municipality may
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not entrust to a police officer the discretionary power "to determine,
as a censor, what literature may be distributed from house to house and
who may distribute it" (308 U.S. 147, 163).
Similar issues were later taken up in Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S.
413 (1943), which concerned the right to appeal a $5.00 fine for
violating a Dallas city ordinance against the distribution of handbills,
and Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943), which involved an ordinance
requiring a thorough investigation before the mayor of Paris could issue
a permit to solicitors. But both of these cases were decided after the
religious clauses were adopted and applied through the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In the meantime, the

~ourt

had begun to chart its new course in

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).

This time a ruling on

religious grounds was unavoidable because the statute in question
empowered the secretary of the public welfare council to determine
whether a particular cause or appeal represented by solicitors was a
religious one.

Newton Cantwell and his two sons were convicted of

violating the statute after they went singly from house to house,
inviting the occupants to listen to phonograph records that described
the books they were selling, and soliciting contributions for pamphlets.
In a separate complaint, two residents of the mostly Catholic
neighborhood claimed that they were tempted to strike Jesse Cantwell,
one of the sons, after he played a record entitled "Enemies," which
attacked their religion and church.
The state insisted that the law in question "merely safeguards
against the perpetration of frauds under the cloak of religion."

But
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the appellants believed that "to require them to obtain a certificate as
a condition of soliciting support for their views amounts to a prior
restraint on the exercise of their religion within the meaning of the
Constitution" (310 U.S. 296, 304).

The unanimous Court held that the

Fourteenth Amendment rendered the states just as incompetent as Congress
to make a law "respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof."

Justice Roberts wrote:

The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of
religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls
compulsion by law of any creed or the practice of any form of
worship.
Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such
religious organization or form of worship as the individual may
choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it
safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion.
Thus
the Amendment embraces two concepts,--freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of
things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to
regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must
have appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of that
protection. In every case the power to regulate must be so
exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to
infringe the protected freedom (310 U.S. 296, 303-04).
The Court also reversed the conviction of Jesse Cantwell for breach
of peace, a charge that the Court characterized as "a common law concept
of the most general and undefined nature."

Nevertheless, the Court

granted that there are limits to the exercise of constitutional
liberties:
Resort to ep~thets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense
communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the
Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no
question under that instrument . . . .
The danger in these times from the coercive activities of those who
in the delusion of racial or religious conceit would incite
violence and breaches of the peace in order to deprive others of
their equal right to the execise of their liberties, is emphasized
by events familiar to all. These and other transgressions of those
limits the states may appropriately punish (310 U.S. 296, 309-10).
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In Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), the Court upheld
the convictions of Jehovah's Witnesses for violating ordinances in three
cities that required a license and the payment of a license tax in order
to sell

books or pamphlets within the municipal limits.

Justice

Stanley Reed wrote for the majority: "The sole constitutional question
considered is whether a nondiscriminatory license fee, presumably
appropriate in amount, may be imposed upon these activities" (316 U.S.
584, 592-93).

On a split of five to four,

the Court indicated that the

fees in question would not raise a religious liberty question unless
they created a substantial burden.

"It is prohibition and unjustifiable

abridgement which is interdicted, not taxation'' (316 U.S. 584, 597).
Chief Justice Stone dissented, however, and maintained that this
was taxation disguised as regulation.

In no case did the cities make

the slightest pretense that the fees were assessed to defray the
expenses of the licensing system:
Here the licenses are not regulatory, save as the licenses
conditioned upon payment of the tax may serve to restrain or
suppress publication. None of the ordinances, if complied with,
purports to or could control the time, place or manner of the
distribution of the books and pamphlets concerned. None has any
discernible relationship to the police protection or the good order
of the community (316 U.S. 584, 605-06).
He further contended that the activity in question lacked commercial
elements that, apart from the exercise of freedom of speech and
religion, might afford a basis for taxation.

But the real issue, he

believed, was the taxation of a liberty protected by the Bill of Rights.
"No one could doubt that taxation which may be freely laid upon
activities not within the protection of the Bill of Rights could--when
applied to the dissemination of ideas--be made the ready instrument for
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destruction of that right" (316 U.S. 584, 607).
The immunity which press and religion enjoy may be lost when they
are united with other activities not immune. Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 62 S.Ct. 920, 86 L.Ed. --. But here the
only activities involved are the dissemination of ideas,
educational and religious, and the collection of funds for the
propagation of those ideas, which we have said is likewise the
subject of constitutional protection (316 U.S. 584, 608).
The Chief Justice also believed that First Amendment freedoms are
immune from taxation because of their "preferred position:"
The First Amendment is not confined to safeguarding freedom of
speech and freedom of religion against discriminatory attempts to
wipe them out. On the contrary the Constitution, by virtue of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, has put those freedoms in a
preferred position. Their commands are not restricted to cases
where the protected privilege is sought out for attack. They
extend at least to every form of taxation which, because it is a
condition of the exercise of the privilege, is capable of being
used to control or suppress it.
Even were we to assume--what I do not concede--that there could be
a lawful nondiscriminatory license tax of a percentage of the gross
receipts collected by churches and other religious orders in
support of their religious work, cf. Giragi v. Moore, 301 U.S. 670,
57 S.Ct. 946, 81 L.Ed. 1334, we have no such tax here (316 U.S.
584, 608-09).
Justice Murphy similarly placed the right of the people "to worship
their Maker" at the apex of constitutional liberties and argued that a
flat fee bearing no relation to the ability to pay is inherently unfair,
comparing the tax unfavorably with the treatment of dissenters by the
early religious establishments: "Research reveals no attempt to control
or persecute by the more subtle means of taxing the function of
preaching, or even any attempt to tap it as a source of revenue" (316

u.s.

584' 623) .
A turnabout came the following year after Justice Wiley Rutledge

joined the Court.

A series of decisions were handed down in May and

June that were united by their identification with the Jehovah's
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Witnesses.

One case involved compulsory flag salutes.

But the other

four grew out of the distribution of religious literature, including a
new decision in Jones v. City of Opelika, 310 U.S. 103 (1943), in which
the Court reversed itself.

In all but one of the latter, the Court

split five to four.
In Murdoch v. Pennsylvania, 310 U.S. 105 (1943), the Court
overturned a Jeannette city ordinance requiring itinerant evangelists to
pay a license fee.

Justice Douglas, who wrote for a new majority,

equated the practice of missionary evangelism with "the more orthodox
and conventional exercises of religion."
The hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of
missionary evangelism--as old as the history of the printing
presses . . . . Its purpose is as evangelical as the revival
meeting. This form of religious activity occupies the same high
estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and
preaching from the pulpits (310 U.S. 105, 108).
He did not concede that the sale of religious literature by these
colporteurs transformed evangelism into a commercial enterprise,
maintaining that if it did "the passing of the collection plate in
church would make the church service a commercial project."

But he also

did not believe that religious groups should be "free from all financial
burdens of government:"
We have here something quite different, for example, from a tax on
the income of one who engages in religious activities or a tax on
property used or employed in connection with those activities. It
is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a
preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax from him for
the privilege of delivering a sermon . . . . The power to tax the
exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its
enjoyment . . . . Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in
this form of missionary evangelism can close its doors to all those
who do not have a full purse (310 U.S. 105, 112).
He compared the power to impose a license tax with the power of
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censorship and denied that it bore any relation to a regulatory
purpose.
In Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), the contested
ordinance merely made it unlawful for a person distributing handbills to
summon a resident to the door in the process.

In his majority opinion,

Justice Black emphasized the broad scope given to the enjoyment of First
Amendment freedoms.

He granted that door to door distributors "may be

either a nuisance or a blind for criminal activities," but then
suggested that the dangers of abuse were best met by "leaving to each
householder the full right to decide whether he will receive strangers
as visitors . .

" (319 U.S. 141, 145, 147).

He reminded the Court that

criminal trespass is still a punishable offense and indicated that
communities may regulate the time, place, and manner of distributing
circulars so as to prevent, for example, the spread of communicable
diseases or the disruption of church services.
But in Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), a
unanimous Court upheld the dismissal of a bill of complaint seeking
injunctive relief against further criminal prosecution of colporteurs as
a violation of their civil rights.

Chief Justice Stone found no reason

to suppose that the city would not acquiesce in the Murdock ruling,
which overturned the ordinance in question, and held that a federal
court of equity should not attempt to determine in advance other issues
that "will be deemed to abridge freedom of speech and religion."
The various dissents in the Jones, Murdoch, and Opelika cases
turned on an iota of difference between the two camps on the issue of
religious liberty.

All sides conceded that religious liberty is
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limited.

They simply differed, as Justice Robert Jackson wrote a year

later, as to "the method of establishing limitations which of necessity
bound religious freedom."
Justice Reed emphasized the taxation issue in his dissent: "It has
never been thought before that freedom from taxation was a prerequisite
attaching to the privileges of the First Amendment.

The national

Government grants exemptions to ministers and churches because it wishes
to do so, not because the Constitution compels" (319 U.S. 105, 130).

He

believed that the Court's decision forced a ''tax subsidy notwithstanding
our accepted belief in the separation of church and state" and
concluded: "The Court now holds that the First Amendment wholly exempts
the church and press from a privilege tax, presumably by the national as
well as the state governments" (319 U.S. 105, 133).
Justice Felix Frankfurter wholly agreed with Justice Reed but
commented further on the tax issue, noting that the petitioners insisted
on "absolute immunity from any kind of monetary exaction for their
occupation" (319 U.S. 105, 134).

He denied that taxes on the income of

clergymen and church-held lands were exempted by the Constitution, then
took exception to the Court's contention that the "power to tax the
exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its
enjoyment."
The power to tax is the power to destroy only in the sense that
those who have the power can misuse it. Mr. Justice Holmes
disposed of this smooth phrase as a constitutional basis for
invalidating taxes when he wrote "The power to tax is not the power
to destroy while this Court sits." Panhandle Oil Co. v. State of
Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223, 48 S.Ct. 451, 453, 72
L.Ed. 857, 56 A.L.R. 583. The fact that a power can be perverted
does not mean that every exercise of the power is a perversion of
the power (319 U.S. 105, 137).
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Citing the additional costs to the city of maintaining peace and
assuring security during the campaign, he continued:

"The real issue

here is not whether a city may charge for the dissemination of ideas but
whether the states have power to require those who need additional
facilities to help bear the cost of furnishing such facilities" (319
U.S. 105, 139).

He found "nothing in the Constitution which exempts

persons engaged in religious activities from sharing equally in the
costs of benefits to all, including themselves, provided by government"
(319

u.s.

105, 140).

Justice Jackson wrote the most detailed dissenting opinion,
beginning with a review of the record in the Douglas case to show the
character of the "Watch Tower Campaign" of 1939 that had precipitated
the case.

The mayor of the city met with the "zone servant" in charge

of the campaign and indicated that Jehovah's Witnesses were at liberty
to distribute their literature in the streets and free of charge from
door to door, "but that the people objected to their attempt to force
these sales, and particularly on Sunday."

But this was rejected by the

sect, which took a confrontational position and proceeded with its
campaign as planned on Palm Sunday.

Over one hundred Witnesses were

driven to a temporary headquarters outside the city limits.
furnished to those who were arrested.

Bonds were

When the complaints exceeded the

number that could be handled by the police, firemen were called in to
assist.
As he turned his attention to the national structure of the
movement, Justice Jackson underscored its lack of financial records, its
secretiveness, and its different methods of paying the full-time and
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part-time ministers who distributed the literature.

He also quoted at

length from this literature, citing denunciations of religion in general
and the Roman Catholic hierarchy in particular.

In one book by Judge

Rutherford, Witnesses were instructed to descend like locusts on the
homes of the people to "'get the kingdom message right into the house
and .

take the veneer off the religious things that are in that

house . . . " (319 U.S. 157, 172).

After describing the incidents that

punctuated this campaign, Justice Jackson criticized his brethren for
merely censoring the draftsmanship of the ordinances without providing
guidelines by which communities could frame new ones:
If the local authorities must draw closer aim at evils than they
did in these cases I doubt that they can ever hit them. What
narrow area of regulation exists under these decisions? . . . If
the entire course of concerted conduct revealed to us is immune, I
should think it neither fair nor wise to throw out to the cities
encouragement to try new restraints. If some part of it passes the
boundary of immunity, I think we should say what part and why in
these cases we are denying the right to regulate it (319 U.S. 157,
178).
He also criticized the elevation of religious liberty to a higher status
than other rights: "I had not supposed that the rights of secular and
nonreligious communications were more narrow or in any way inferior to
those of avowed religious groups'' (319 U.S. 157, 179).
He concluded with an appeal for a common sense test that asked
"what the effect would be if the right given to these Witnesses should
be exercised by all sects and denominations."

He was concerned that

putting behavior as theirs on the same constitutional plane as "'worship
in the churches and preaching from the pulpits' .

would have a

dangerous tendency towards discrediting religious freedom" (319 U.S.
157, 180).

The faith of the people, he believed, is the ultimate
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guaranty of civil liberties.

In the interest of sustaining that faith,

he maintained that the Court has an obligation to clearly define the
reasons for its decisions.
The Court divided again the following year in Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), when it upheld the conviction of a
woman for permitting her niece to sell magazines near a street
intersection.

2

Justice Rutledge, who wrote for the majority of five,

acknowledged the religious rights of parents as well as children and
conceded that an identical ordinance applicable to all persons generally
would be invalid.

But he invoked the parens patriae prerogative of the

state over children and adults, claiming that the "state's authority
over children's activities is broader than over like actions of adults."
Citing possible "emotional excitement and psychological or physical
injury," he doubted that even the presence of an adult could forestall
situations "wholly inappropriate for children, especially of tender
years, to face" (321 U.S. 158, 170).

He also rejected the Jehovah's

Witneses contention that the street is their church.
Justice Jackson, who was joined by Justices Frankfurter and
Roberts, again dissented, this time alluding to the ironies into which
the Court was falling:
The novel feature of this decision is this: the Court holds that a
state may apply child labor laws to restrict or prohibit an
activity of which, as recently as last term, it held: "This form of
religious activity occupies the same high estate under the First
Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching from the
pulpits. It has the same claim to protection as the more orthodox
and conventional exercises of religion" (321 U.S. 158, 176).
Although he still found it difficult "to believe that going upon the
streets to accost the public is the same thing as withdrawing to a
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private structure for religious worship," he believed that under the
Murdock rule "it would seem that child labor laws may be applied to both
if to either.

If the Murdock doctrine stands along with today's

decision, a foundation is laid for any state intervention in the
indoctrination and participation of children in religion, provided it is
done in the name of their health and welfare" (321 U.S. 158, 177).
Justice Jackson reiterated his earlier appeal for a common sense
test that would leave purely religious activities "as nearly absolutely
free as anything can be" but allow secular activities--such as
''money-making activities on a public scale"--to be regulated:
The Court in the Murdock case rejected this principle of separating
immune religious activities from secular ones in declaring the
disabilities which the Constitution imposed on local authorities.
Instead, the Court now draws a line based on age that cuts across
both true exercise of religion and auxiliary secular activities. I
think this is not a correct principle for defining the activities
immune from regulation on grounds of religion, and Murdock
overrules the grounds on which I think affirmance should rest. I
have no alternative but to dissent from the grounds of affirmance
of a judgment which I think was rightly decided, and upon right
grounds, by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (321 U.S.
158, 178).
Justice Murphy, however, challenged the conviction itself,
contending that the state had failed to meet its burden of proving the
reasonableness of the prohibition.

He found no evidence in the record

to indicate that "such activity was likely to affect adversely the
health, morals and welfare of the child" and deemed it unlikely that
children engaged in a serious religious activity were "'subject to all
the diverse influences of the street'" (321 U.S. 158, 174-75).
In Follett v. Town of McCormick, S.C., 321 U.S. 573 (1944), the
Court similarly split over the issue of taxation when it struck down an
ordinance requiring agents selling books to pay either a daily or annual
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license fee.

The appellant was not an itinerant evangelist but a rather

a resident of the town.

The record showed that he earned his livelihood

by the sale of his religious books.

The three dissenters believed that

his exemption from an occupational tax other street vendors were
required to pay amounted to a subsidy of his religion.
This long series of cases came to a conclusion with Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), and Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946).
In the first, the Court rejected the right of a company-owned town to
refuse colporteurs access to a business block freely used by the public
in general.

The Texas case involved a government-owned village but was

otherwise indistinguishable from the Alabama case.

The dissenters

contended that the ruling in the first case was particularly unnecessary
because the distribution of literature could readily be confined to the
public highway that abutted the district and were disturbed by the
ramifications of forcing "private owners to open their property for the
practice there of religious activities or propaganda distasteful to the
owner . .

" (326 U.S. 501, 516-17).

But three years later, the Court

declined to extend this precedent to a private apartment building in
Watchtower Society v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 335 U.S. 886
(1949), cert. denied.
During the entire series, the Court reached a consensus only in the
Lovell, Cantwell, and Douglas cases.

The other decisions disclosed the

beginnings of a deep-seated and long-lasting rift within the Court.
Justices Black, Douglas, Rutledge, and Chief Justice Stone generally
voted as one bloc; Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Roberts as
another.

Justice Murphy joined the dissenters on one occasion when he
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believed that the interests of religious liberty were better served.
Justice Reed, who was normally among the dissenters, concurred in the
Follett case because he concluded that the Court's rulings had become
law.

The unsettled state of judicial doctrine persisted, as subsequent

cases show.
By failing to come to terms with the problem of defining the scope
of religious liberty, which became the major issue in the Opelika,
Murdock, and Martin cases, the Court resorted to an ungainly case by
case approach that tempted state and local governments with the
inference that regulation of canvassing was still permissible in some
unspecified form.

But despite the decision in the Prince case, in which

the ideological discord within the Court reached its highest pitch, such
a hope' proved illusory.

By 1944, the way had already been prepared for

a redefinition of religion.

The dichotomy between belief and action

kept the problem of defining the scope of religious practice ever close
at hand.
The Ballard Case
Three months after its Prince decision, the Supreme Court took a
large step toward redefining religion and expanding its privileges in
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).

The late Guy Ballard, a

student of the mystic arts, had for some time represented himself as the
chosen instrument of certain ''ascended masters," including Saint
Germain, Jesus, George Washington, and Godfre Ray King.

Before his

death, he and two members of his family, who circulated literature and
solicited funds for his "I Am" movement, had been charged with making
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false representations and were convicted of mail fraud.
The Court reversed the convictions in a five to four split
decision.

Justice Douglas quoted the Watson dictum for support: "'The

law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the
establishment of no sect"' (322 U.S. 78, 86).

Relying on the Cantwell

formulation of the belief-action dichotomy, he ventured into new
territory by making sincerity, but not veracity, a test of belief:
The religious views espoused by respondents might seem incredible,
if not preposterous, to most people. But if those doctrines are
subject to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or
falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of
any sect. When the triers of fact undertake that task, they enter
a forbidden domain . . . (322 U.S. 78, 87).
Chief Justice Stone dissented, holding that such a determination
could properly be made by a jury:
I am not prepared to say that the constitutional guaranty of
freedom of religion affords immunity from criminal prosecution for
the fraudulent procurement of money by false statements as to one's
religious experiences, more than it renders polygamy or libel
immune from criminal prosecution (322 U.S. 78, 88-89).
The Chief Justice had the support of common law precedent as, for
example, in Lord Manfield's speech before the House of Lords in
Chamberlain of London v. Evans regarding inquiry into the bona fides of
a dissenter "who bepleads the Toleration act:"
It has been said, that "this being a matter between God and a man's
own conscience, it cannot come under the cognizance of a jury."
But certainly it may: and though God alone is the absolute judge of
a man's religious profession, and of his conscience; yet there are
some marks even of sincerity, among which there is none more
certain than consistency. Surely a man's sincerity may be judged
of by overt acts: It is a just and excellent maxim, which will hold
good i~ this as in all other cases, "By their fruits ye shall know
them."
Justice Jackson also dissented, but on entirely different grounds,
maintaining the case should have been thrown out:
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In the first place, as a matter of either practice of philosophy I
do not see how we can separate an issue as to what is believed from
considerations as to what is believable . .
If we try religious sincerity severed from religious verity, we
isolate the dispute from the very considerations which in common
experience provide its most reliable answer . . . (322 U.S. 78, 92,
93).
He concluded: "I would dismiss the indictment and have done with this
business of judicially examining other people's faith" (322 U.S. 78,
95).
All three opinions in the Ballard case showed a similar perplexity
concerning the interpretation and application of the free exercise
clause.

It was an isolated case, but the decision carried the risk of

trivializing the definition of religion.

Justice Jackson's comments on

the harmful effects of religious fraud--which recall his appeal for a
common sense test and respect for the faith of the people--apply with
particular force to a more general loss of respect for law:
The chief wrong which false prophets do to their following is not
financial. The collections aggregate a tempting total, but
individual payments are not ruinous. I doubt if the vigilance of
the law is equal to making money stick by over-credulous people.
But the real harm is on the mental and spiritual plane . . . . The
wrong of these things, as I see it, is not in the money the victims
part with half so much as in the mental and spiritual poison they
get. But that is precisely the thing the Constitution put beyond
the reach of the prosecutor, for the price of freedom of religion
or of speech or of the press is that we must put up with, and even
pay for, a good deal of rubbish (322 U.S., 94, 95).
Compulsory Flag Salutes

At the time of the incorporation of the free exercise clause in its
Cantwell decision, the Court repeated a pattern that typified its bold
advances on that front by refusing to otherwise break new ground in the
extension of civil liberties protections, perhaps enabling it to
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consolidate its position.

This time the advance was immediately

followed by a retreat from the libertarian stance, two weeks after its
Cantwell ruling, in Minerville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586
(1940), which was the first of the celebrated compulsory flag salute
cases to be given a full discussion.
The case and its outcome recalled some of the free speech cases
that followed the First World War, like Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919), in which the Court affirmed the criminal conviction of
civilians for circulating antidraft leaflets among soldiers and Justice
Holmes delivered his famous "clear and present danger" opinion.

Once

again, as in the private school cases, the issue was Americanism.
In 1935, Lillian and William Gobitis had been expelled from
Minersville Public School for refusing to salute the national flag as
required at their daily school exercises.

The children believed that to

do so was contrary to the law of God (Exod. 20:4-5) and that a failure
to obey this command would result in their eternal destruction.

Their

father, Walter Gobitis applied to the federal district court for an
injunction on the grounds that the religious beliefs of Jehovah's
Witnesses do not permit them to bow down to graven images, including the
national flag.

He was granted a perpetual injunction even though the

Supreme Court had already declined to hear a similar case, Leoles v.
Landers, 192 S.E. 218 (1937), appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 656 (1937).
Although the district court ruling was later affirmed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals, the children were still unable to attend the school.
The attorneys for the school district cited the Davis rule in
support of its claim that the refusal of the children to salute the
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national flag was not founded on a religious belief:
The act of saluting the flag has no bearing on what a pupil may
think of his Creator or what are his relations to his Creator. Nor
is a pupil required to exhibit his religious sentiments in a
particular "form of worship" when saluting the flag, because the
ceremony is not, by any stretch of the imagination, a "form of
worship" (310 U.S. 586, 588).
They denied that a pupil was in any way prevented "from acknowledging
the spiritual sovereignty of Almighty God by rendering to God the things
which are God's."
In his brief, Joseph Rutherford, one of the attorneys for the
Gobitis family, summarized the relevant doctrines of the sect and then
contrasted what he called constitutional with totalitarian government:
A rule which compels school children to daily participate in a
formal ceremony, to wit, placing the hand over the heart,
stretching forth the hand toward the flag and at the same time
repeating words of reverence and devotion, thereby recognizing the
State as the sovereign, higher or supreme power, and attributing to
the Stat4 protection and salvation, is a form of religious
worship.
Justice Felix Frankfurter, who wrote for the majority in reversing
the lower court rulings, regarded the issue as one that touched on the
very essence of national unity: "We are dealing with an interest
inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values.
the basis of national security" (310 U.S. 586, 595).

National unity is
He believed that

''the manifold character of man's relations may bring his conception of
religious duty into conflict with the secular interests of his
fellow-men" and that any claim to an unlimited right to follow
conscience "would deny that very plurality of principles which, as a
matter of history, underlies protection of religious toleration" (310

u.s.

586, 593, 594).
What the school authorities are really asserting is the right to

330

awaken in the child's mind considerations as to the significance of
the flag contrary to those implanted by the parent. In such an
attempt the state is normally at a disadvantage in competing with
the parent's authority, so long--and this is the vital aspect of
religious toleration--as parents are unmolested in their right to
counteract by their own persuasiveness the wisdom and rightness of
those loyalties which the state's educational system is seeking to
promote (3l0 U.S. 586, 599).
In a sharp dissent that prompted a pained reply from Justice
Frankfurter, Justice Stone wrote that the essence of civil liberty "is
the freedom of the individual from compulsion as to what he shall think
and what he shall say, at least where the compulsion is to bear false
witness to his religion."
History teaches us that there have been but few infringements of
personal liberty by the state which have not been justified, as
they are here, in the name of righteousness and the public good,
and few which have not been directed, as they are now, at
politically helpless minorities.
. . . I am not persuaded that we should refrain from passing upon
the legislative judgment "as long as the remedial channels of the
democratic proces remain open and unobstructed." This seems to me
no less than the surrender of the constitutional protection of the
liberty of small minorities to the popular will (3l0 U.S. 586, 604,
605-06).
Few Supreme Court decisions have provoked greater controversy.

The

ruling was greeted with outrage by civil libertarians and a wave of
persecutions against members of the sect. 5
Three years later, the same issue was decided to the contrary in
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, Jl9 U.S. 624 (l943),
following the reversal of the Opelika decision.

Here the flag salute

was part of an overall program "'for the purpose of teaching, fostering
and perpetuating the ideals, principles and spirit. of Americanism . . . '"
(3l9 U.S. 624, 625).
position.

By this time, three justices had switched their

Justice Jackson wrote for the new majority:
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The sole conflict is between authority and the rights of the
individual. The State asserts power to condition access to public
education on making a prescribed sign and profession and at the
same time to coerce attendance by punishing both parent and child.
The latter stand on a right of self-determination in matters that
touch individual opinion and personal attitude (319 U.S. 624,
630-31).
He argued that the burden of proving the validity of such a requirement
rests with its proponents and denied that First Amendment freedoms may
be infringed simply because a state regulation has a "rational basis:"
They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and
immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect.
It is important to note that while it is the Fourteenth Amendment
which bears directly upon the state it is the more specific
limiting principles of the First Amendment that finally govern this
case (319 U.S. 624, 639).
The heart of the Gobitis ruling, he believed, was its approval of
compulsory measures for national unity.

While he did not quarrel with

the end, he stipulated that it be achieved through permissible means:
Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is the
lesson of every such drive from the Roman drive to stamp out
Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as
a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a
means to Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our
present totalitarian enemies. Those who begin coercive elimination
of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters.
Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of
the graveyard.
It seems trite but necessary to say that the First Amendment to our
Constitution was designed to avoid these ends by avoiding these
beginnings (319 U.S. 624, 641 ).
He concluded by emphasizing that the Bill of Rights was designed to
protect intellectual and spiritual diversity and prevent those in
authority from coercing consent from the governed:
To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic
ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory
routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our
institutions to free minds.
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If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it
is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein (319 U.S. 624, 641, 642).
In a concurring .opinion, Justices Black and Douglas explained their
change of view:
Reluctance to make the Federal Constitution a rigid bar against
state regulation of conduct thought inimical to the public welfare
was the controlling influence which moved us to consent to the
Gobitis decision. Long reflection convinced us that although the
principle is sound, its application in the particular case was
wrong (319 U.S. 624, 643).
In a separate concurrence, Justice Murphy underscored the importance of
the freedom to believe: "Reflection has convinced me that as a judge I
have no loftier duty or responsibility than to uphold that spiritual
freedom to its farthest reaches" (319 U.S. 624, 645).
But Justice Frankfurter held firm in his previous position and
explained his views on "judicial self-restraint" at letigth, believing
that--despite his sympathy with the libertarian views expressed in the
Court's opinion--he would be unjustified in writing his private opinions
about policy into the Constitution:
We are not reviewing merely the action of a local school board.
The flag salute requirement in this case comes before us with the
full authority of the State of West Virginia. We are in fact
passing judgment on 'the power of the State as a whole'.
To
suggest that we are here concerned with the heedless action of some
village tyrants is to distort the augustness of the constitutional
issue and the reach of the consequences of our decision" (319 U.S.
624, 650-51 ).
In the case of "a general non-discriminatory civil regulation" that
touches on conscientious scruples, he wrote, it is the province of the
legislature to make accommodations.

"If the function of this Court is

to be essentially no different from that of a legislature, . . . then
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indeed judges should not have life tenure and they should be made
directly responsible to the electorate" (319 U.S. 624, 652).
Justice Frankfurter proceeded to examine the constitutional
provision for religious liberty and concluded that it did not create new
privileges:
It gave religious equality, not civil immunity. Its essence is
freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from
conformity to law because of religious dogma . .
Law is concerned with external behavior and not with the inner life
of man. It rests in large measure upon compulsion . . . . the
individual conscience may profess what faith it chooses. It may
affirm and promote that faith . . . but it cannot thereby restrict
community action through political organs in matters of community
concern, so long as the action is not asserted in a discriminatory
way either openly or by stealth. One may have to practice one's
religion and at the same time owe the duty of formal obedience to
laws that run contrary to one's beliefs. Compelling belief implies
denial of opportunity to combat it and to assert dissident views.
Such compulsion is one thing. Quite another matter is submission
to conformity of action while denying its wisdom or virtue and with
ample opportunity for seeking its change or abrogation (319 U.S.
624, 653, 655-56).
He found nothing in the flag salute requirement to distinguish it from
the military training requirement in the Hamilton case and quoted
Justice Benjamin Cardozo's concurring opinion in that case: "'The right
of private judgment has never yet been so exalted above the powers and
the compulsion of the agencies of government'" (293 U.S. 245, 268; 319

u.s.

624, 657).
If the Court were to make an exception in this instance, he

continued, it must similarly deal with other complexities that arise out
of the administration of local school systems.

He cited as examples

compulsory Bible reading, the teaching of either creation or evolution,
the chauvinistic teaching of history, and the double educational burden
carried by parents who do not send their children to public schools.
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These questions are not lightly stirred. They touch the most
delicate issues and their solution challenges the best wisdom of
political and religious statesmen. But it presents awful
possibilities to try to encase the solution of these problems
within the rigid prohibitions of unconstitutionality (319 U.S. 624,
661).
Against the argument that symbolism is a primitive way of communicating
ideas, he replied that it is inescapable and rejected as flippant
another argument that the "requirement to salute the flag implies equal
validity of a requirement to salute a dictator."

Unlike an oath test,

saluting the flag suppresses no belief.
But Justice Frankfurter felt most fortified in his view by the
Court's own handling of the flag salute controversy.

Thirteen justices

including all but the two who were sitting on the matter for the first
time had previously "found no constitutional infirmity in what is now
condemned."
The Court has no reason for existence if it merely reflects the
pressures of the day. Our system is built on the faith that men
set apart for this special function, freed from the influences of
immediacy and from the deflections of worldly ambition, will become
able to take a view of longer range than the period of
responsibility entrusted to Congress and the legislatures. We are
dealing with matters as to which legislators and voters have
conflicting views. Are we as judges to impose our strong
convictions on where wisdom lies? That which three years ago had
seemed to five successive Courts to lie within permissible areas of
legislation is now outlawed by the deciding shift of opinion of two
Justices. What reason is there to believe that they or their
successors may not have another view a few years hence? Is that
which was deemed to be of so fundamental a nature as to be written
into the Constitution to endure for all times to be the sport of
shifting winds of doctrine? Of course, judicial opinions, even as
to questions of constitutionality, are not immutable. As has been
true in the past, the Court will from time to time reverse its
position. But I believe that never before these Jehovah's
Witnesses cases (except for minor deviations subsequently retraced)
has this Court overruled decisions so as to restrict the powers of
democratic government. Always heretofore, it has withdrawn narrow
views of legislative authority so as to authorize what formerly it
had denied (319 U.S. 624, 665-66).
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The ''minor deviations" to which he referred were an older variety
of judicial activism that at times used the doctrine of substantive due
process to overturn legislative innovations.

"Such undefined

destructive power was not conferred on this Court by the Constitution."
But the new activism similarly troubled him as an uncontrollable power.
He concluded:
Of course patriotism cannot be enforced by the flag salute. But
neither can the liberal spirit be enforced by judicial invalidation
of illiberal legislation. Our constant preoccupation with the
constitutionality of legislation rather than with its wisdom tends
to preoccupation of the American mind with a false value. The
tendency of focusing attention on constitutionality is to make
constitutionality synonymous with wisdom, to regard a law as all
right if it is constitutional. Such an attitude is a great enemy
of liberalism. Particularly in legislation affecting freedom of
thought and freedom of speech much which should offend a
free-spirited society is constitutional. Reliance for the most
precious interests of civilization, therefore, must be found
outside of their vindication in courts of law. Only a persistent
positive translation of th~ faith of a free society into the
convictions and habits and actions of a community is the ultimate
reliance against unabated temptations to fetter the human spirit
(319 u.s. 624, 670-71 ).
In a companion decision, Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583
(1943), the Court reversed the convictions of three Jehovah's Witnesses
for disseminating teachings and literature tending ''to create an
attitude of stubborn refusal to salute, honor, and respect the flag and
government of the United States."

Justice Roberts, who was one of the

three dissenters in the Barnette case, wrote for a unanimous Court: "If
the state cannot Gonstrain one to violate his conscientious religious
conviction by saluting the national emblem, then certainly it cannot
punish him for imparting his views on the subject to his fellows and
exhorting them to accept those views" (319 U.S. 583, 589).
More than three decades later, the Court recalled the Barnette

336
precedent in a related case concerning symbolic expression and a
"required affirmation of belief."

In Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705

(1977), which involved a husband and wife who were members of Jehovah's
Witnesses, the Court affirmed an award of injunctive and declaratory
relief against further arrests and prosecutions for violating two
statutes: one that required all noncommercial vehicles to bear license
plates embossed with the state motto, "Live Free or Die," and another
that made it a misdemeanor to deliberately obscure "the figures or
letters on any license plate."

The husband had been cited three times

in a three month period and had served a sentence of 15 days for
covering over the motto because he refused to advertise a slogan he
found "morally, ethically, and politically abhorrent."

Three justices,

however, dissented in whole or part, including Justice Rehnquist, who
faulted the Court's logic and contended that the comparable use of
currency by an atheist "does not convey any affirmation of belief on his
part in the motto 'In God We Trust"' (430 U.S. 705, 722).
The flag salute cases, which so clearly recorded the changes in
judicial philosophy during this time of transition, were complicated by
the clash of competing values.

As in the Meyer and Pierce cases, the

issues of national unity, family rights, and intellectual liberty, and
religious liberty were once again raised.

Justice Frankfurter

understood the issue as an unequal competition between parental
authority and whatever loyalties the state's educational system may seek
to promote.

But a practical test of the scope and limits of each sphere

was nowhere in evidence.
Three considerations in particular were frequently addressed by the
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Court during this period: jurisdiction, judicial reasoning, and justice
of the outcome.

The problems created by the Court's expansion of its

area of jurisdiction were probably most clearly delineated by Justice
Frankfurter.

The first three flag salute cases, he reminded his

brethren, had been dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.
Now, by its change of course, he believed the Court was "passing
judgment on 'the power of the State as a whole"' (319 U.S. 524, 650).
Justice Jackson, in turn, was especially sensitive to the problem
of sharply defining the scope of religious liberty.

He generally agreed

with the Court's earlier reservations against exalting private judgment
over the lawmaking authority.
Frankfurter.

In most cases, he lined up with Justice

The Barnette decision was one of the exceptions.

A third consideration--the intrinsic justice of the
outcome--continues to enter the religion cases and may account as much
as anything for the unpredictability of the Court's rulings.

This

disposition raises a fundamental question: By what standard is justice
to be measured?

The Court had weighed polygamy in the balances of a

generalized Christian morality and found it wanting in constitutional
protection.

But no such test was applied in the Barnette case.

It is

in this area of private judgment and conscientious scruples--especially
those of the justices--that Justice Frankfurter's warning is most
apropos: "Equally inadmissible is the claim to strike down legislation
because to us as individuals it seems opposed to the 'plan and purpose'
of the Constitution.

That is too tempting a basis for finding in one's

personal views the purposes of the Founders" (319 U.S. 624, 666).
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Speech and Assembly

Like the religious solicitation cases, the third series of cases
involving Jehovah's Witnesses typified the trend toward a relaxation of
the Court's Reynolds and Davis tests.

As late as 1940, Justice

Frankfurter was able to deny that the Gobitis case involved a religious
issue.

By 1944, this would have been unthinkable.

Within a few years,

the credentials of various religions and believers had become virtually
untestable.

The practical effect was to render religious liberty

increasingly meaningless as a separate and distinct category from the
other Bill of Rights guarantees.
Like some of the others, the speech and assembly cases were often
decided with little reference to purely religious questions.

In Cox v.

New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), the Court made reference to all the
First Amendment freedoms: worship, speech, press, and assembly.

The

five appellants had been convicted of violating a statute prohibiting
unlicensed parades or processions after participating in an "information
march" in which groups of Witnesses carrying signs marched single-file
along the sidewalks of Manchester.
convictions.

On appeal, the Court sustained their

Chief Justice Hughes wrote:

The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to
assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of
public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil
liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good
order upon which they ultimately depend (312 U.S. 569, 574).
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), the Court
upheld the conviction of colporteur who, after twice being warned that
his actions were creating a disturbance, was arrested and charged with
cursing a public officer.

It contended that the prevention and
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punishment of certain limited classes of speech had "never been thought
to raise any Constitutional problems.

These include the lewd and

obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting'
words--those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace."
The Court's decision in Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948),
however, mirrors the sharp disagreements and even antagonisms that had
subsequently arisen within the Court.

The case hinged on the use of

sound amplification equipment by a minister of the Jehovah's Witnesses
in a public park.

Justice Black, writing for the majority of five, saw

it as another instance of prior restraint on speech, noting that the
ordinance forbade the use of such equipment where the sound was cast
directly on public places unless permission were granted by the police
chief.

Any "abuses which loud-speakers create," he asserted, "can be

controlled by narrowly drawn statutes" (334 U.S. 558, 562).
Justice Frankfurter dissented: "modern devices for amplifying the
range and volume of the human voice

. afford easy, too easy,

opportunities for aural aggression.

If uncontrolled, the result is

intrusion into cherished privacy'' (334 U.S. 558, 563).

Justice Jackson

even contended that the decision actually endangered the right of free
speech "by making it ridiculous and obnoxious" and testily commented:
"It was setting up this system of microphone, wires and sound truck
without a permit, that this appellant was convicted--it was not for
speaking" (334 U.S. 558, 567).
Seven months later, the Saia dissenters picked up the vote of Chief
Justice Fred Vinson in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), and upheld
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the conviction of a labor organizer for violating an ordinance
prohibiting the use of sound amplifying devices to make "loud and
raucous noises."

Although the Court did not so rule, Justice Jackson

agreed with Justice Black and two other dissenters that the it was a
repudiation of the Saia decision.
A third five to four split decision followed in Terminiello v. City
of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), reversing the statutory breach of peace
conviction of Father Arthur Terminiello, a suspended priest, for
provoking a crowd gathered outside the auditorium where he spoke.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, avoided the issue of
"fighting words" by singling out the original instructions to the jury,
in which the words "breach of peace" were so defined as to include
speech.

Although Albert Dilling, the petitioner's counsel, had not

objected to the instruction, Justice Douglas wrote that "the gloss which
Illinois placed on the ordinance gives it a meaning and application
which are conclusive on us" (337 U.S. 1, 5).
In his dissent, Chief Justice Vinson noted that the "offending
sentence in the instructions to the jury has heretofore gone completely
undetected:"

Justice Frankfurter made a similar point:

For the first time in the course of the 130 years in which State
prosecutions have come here for review, this Court is today
reversing a sentence imposed by a State court on a ground that was
urged neither here nor below and that was explicitly disclaimed on
behalf of the petitioner at the bar of this Court (337 U.S. 1,
8-9).

But it was Justice Jackson--formerly an Attorney General and the
chief American prosecutor in the war crimes trial at Nuremberg--who
delved into the trial record, as he had done in the Douglas case, in
order to remove the discussion from the rarefied atmosphere of

341

philosophical abstraction.

He first recited the details of the speech

''that provoked a hostile mob and incited a friendly one,'' then described
the two groups that were involved:
This was not an isolated, spontaneous and unintended collision of
political, racial or ideological adversaries. It was a local
manifestation of a world-wide and standing conflict between two
organized groups of revolutionary fanatics, each of which has
imported to this country the strong-arm technique developed in the
struggle by which their kind has devastated Europe. Increasingly,
American cities have to cope with it. One faction organizes a mass
meeting, the other organizes pickets to harass it; each organizes
squads to counteract the other's pickets; parade is met with
counterparade. Each of these mass demonstrations has the
potentiality, and more than a few the purpose, of disorder and
violence. This technique appeals not to reason but to fears and
mob spirit; each is a show of force designed to bully adversaries
and to overawe the indifferent. We need not resort to speculation
as to the purposes for which these tactics are calculated nor as to
their consequences. Recent European history demonstrates both (337
u.s. 1' 23).
He found it impossible to square this ruling with the Cantwell and
Chaplinsky decisions.

But he also raised the incorporation issue and

called for restaint:
The Fourteenth Amendment forbade states to deny the citizen ''due
process of law." But its terms gave no notice to the people that
its adoption would strip their local governments of power to deal
with such problems of local peace and order as we have here. Nor
was it hinted by this Court for over half a century that the
Amendment might have any such effect. In 1922, with concurrence of
the most liberty-alert Justices of all times--Holmes and
Brandeis--this Court declared flatly that the Constitution does not
limit the power of the state over free speech. Prudential
Insurance co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543, 42 S.Ct. 516, 522, 66
L.Ed. 1044, 27 A.L.R. 27. In later years the Court shifted its
dogma and decreed that the Constitution does this very thing and
that state power is bound by the same limitation as Congress.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138. I
have no quarrel with this history. See West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed.
1628, 147 A.L.R. 674. I recite the method by which the right to
limit the state has been derived only from this Court's own
assumption of the power, with never a submission of legislation or
amendment into which the people could write any qualification to
prevent abuse of this liberty, as bearing upon the restraint I
consider as becoming in exercise of self-given and unappealable
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power (337 U.S. 1, 28-29).
In Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951 ), the Court unanimously
reversed the conviction of two Jehovah's Witnesses for disorderly
conduct, finding no evidence of disorder or threat of violence at the
time they were arrested at a public park while giving Bible talks.
ordinance was involved.

No

But in Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951 ),

the Court overturned an ordinance that made it unlawful to hold meetings
on the streets of New York City without a permit from the police
commissioner.

The appellant was an ordained Baptist minister whose

permit was revoked in 1946 "on evidence that he had ridiculed other
religious beliefs in his meetings."

Although the minister did not

challenge the revocation, he contended that his subsequent applications
for a permit were rejected without explanation.

He was fined in 1948

for holding a religious meeting without a permit.
Justice Jackson's dissent in the latter case was reminiscent of his
Terminiello opinion.

Noting that a fight had broken out after the

minister denounced Catholics and Jews in the vilest terms, he believed
that the police may require a speaker to temporarily yield his
unquestioned right of free speech during emergency situations involving
angry crowds.

He quoted the Cantwell decision in support of this

principle: "'Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper
sense communication of information or or opinion safeguarded by the
Constitution'" (310 U.S. 296, 309-10; 340 U.S. 290, 302-03).
Two years later a unanimous Court reversed the conviction of a
Jehovah's Witness for violating an ordinance that prohibited anyone from
addressing a political or religious meeting in any public park.

Justice
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Douglas pointed out that the ordinance, as construed and applied by the
City of Pawtucket, did not forbid church services in the park.

In

effect, some religious groups were given preference:
Appellant's sect has conventions that are different from the
practices of other religious groups. Its religious service is less
ritualistic, more unorthodox, less formal than some. But apart
from narrow exceptions not relevant here, Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244; Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333,
10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637, it is no business of courts to say that
what is a religious practice or activity for one group is not
religion under the protection of the First Amendment.
In Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953), however, the Court
upheld the conviction of another Jehovah's Witness for conducting
religious services in a public park after having been arbitrarily
refused a license by the city council and rejected his contention that
the ordinance in question was unconstitutional.

Justice Reed, who wrote

for the majority, noted that it had been narrowly construed by the state
courts so as to permit no discretion, discrimination, or interference
with free speech.

The Court held that redress must be sought through

appropriate judicial procedure, annoying and expensive though it may be.
Justice Douglas, who was joined by Justice Black in his dissent,
contended that the First Amendment forbade "even a reasonable regulation
of the right of free speech" (345 U.S. 395, 425).
A final case that falls into this general category is Burstyn v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), in which the Court unanimously reversed the
New York Board of Regent's revocation of a movie operator's license for
showing a film, "The Miracle," alleged to be sacrilegious.

Justice Tom

Clark pointed out that "the state has no legitimate interest in
protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them which is
sufficient to justify prior restraints upon the expression of those
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views" (343 U.S. 495, 505).

In a lengthy concurring opinion, Justice

Frankfurter recounted the history of prohibitions against sacrilege and
blasphemy, noting that sacrilege--which means "church-robbing"--was
restricted in Roman Catholic doctrine and most dictionary definitions to
"the physical abuse of physical objects" Hhile blasphemy encompassed
verbal offenses of the sort alleged.

Under the tradition of state

religion, blasphemy became "the chameleon phrase which meant the
criticism of whatever the ruling authority of the moment established as
orthodox religious doctrine . . . " (343 U.S. 495, 529).

But, he noted,

even the English common law crime of blasphemy had by then been
considerably limited.

He contrasted this with the "vague, undefinable

powers of censorship" the New York courts permitted.
These cases cut a striking contrast with the earlier religious
solicitation series.

The note of urgency and the strong emphasis on the

unique claims of religious liberty are--with one or two
exceptions--missing in these cases, many of which leave an impression
almost of diffidence.

The religious issues had by now become barely

distinguishable from the free speech and assembly issues and the
"preferred position" of religion soon became a plural preference that
embraced the entire First Amendment.

The passion that brought great

minds into play had perhaps, as the novelty of the issues wore thin,
dissipated into a routine of hairsplitting analyses and shifting
alliances that often left the justices at loggerheads.
This does not mean that all the important issues had been settled.
After the war, other matters--especially those relating to internal
security--began challenging the attention and stretching the resources
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of the Court.

The next set of burning religious issues--aid to private

schools and religion in public schools--brought the establishment clause
to center stage.

The public debate over religion in education flared

briefly in 1947 and 1948 before being ignited in earnest in the early
1960s.

It was only then that free exercise issues involving questions

of religious conscience were once again given full attention.

But by

then the terms of the constitutional debate had begun to change in
response to a changing religious environment and to accommodate a
growing theological debate over fundamental religious questions.

In the

process, the Court's definition of religion evolved from a theistic to
an increasingly pantheistic and even nontheistic basis.
The Establishment Clause
The flood of free exercise cases that followed the Cantwell
decision was not followed by a similar burst of activity on the
establishment side of the ledger until the early 1960s.

But beginning

in 1947, a controversial series of establishment cases led to the
toppling of some of the major pillars of civil religion in America,
resulting in acute and lasting divisions both within society and within
the Court.

Even though judicial doctrine concerning religious exercises

in public school classrooms is now well settled, school prayer still
persists in many parts of the country and public opinion remains
unsettled on the issue.

The problem of aid to private schools, however,

is so far from being settled even within the Court that many of its
recent rulings have been surprising in light of earlier rhetoric about
building a "wall of separation" between church and state that is "high
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and impregnable."

In fact, school aid was the subject of the first

major establishment case.
The Everson Case
Justice Hugo Black's opinion in Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U. S. 1 (1947), marks a major constitutional turning point regarding the
interpretation of the religion clauses.

The issue in this case was the

provision of public transportation to both public and parochial school
children in the New Jersey township of Ewing.
Speaking for a divided Court, Justice Black began by disposing of
the due process objection to the public financing of bus transportation
for children attending Catholic parochial schools.

He cited the Cochran

ruling in defense of the public purpose served by such aid and applied
the "child benefit theory."

By indicating that these payments promoted

a legitimate public good--that is, child safety--he appeared to concede
some ground to the accommodationist position.
He then turned to the the establishment clause objections and began
by restating the incorporation rule, citing a passage in the Murdoch
ruling, after which he proceeded to a lengthy review of the religious
purposes and persecutions that shaped American history, drawing the
earlier discussion by Chief Justice Waite in his Reynolds opinion.

His

discourse culminated in a brief reference to the famous Danbury letter
from which he extrapolated a test to determine whether a particular law
or policy violated the establishment clause:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force or influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or
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force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance. No
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called,
or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or
groups, and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect n~
wall of separation between Church and State" (330 U.S. 1, 15-16)
He concluded by remarking that while the "wall must be kept high and
impregnable," it had not been breached in this case.
The Everson test became the standard by which all subsequent
establishment rulings have been measured.

But Justice Black here

evidenced a greater concern to inject a particular interpretation into
the establishment clause than to reconcile the separationist theory with
the accommodationist effect of the ruling.

Many of the issues were left

unresolved, as Mark DeWolfe Howe later observed:
Justices who have insisted that the Fourteenth Amendment did
incorporate the Bill of Rights have not always told us which clause
of the amendment accomplishes the incorporation. We are thus left
in a condition of considerable uncertainty as to whether the due
process clause has done the trick. Nor have we been told with
clarity wha7, precisely, is meant by the Bill of Rights in this
connection.
Four members of the Court dissented.

Justice Jackson had by then

become persuaded of the correctness of the separationist position and,
for that reason, dissented from what he regarded as the Court's failure
to apply it.

He scolded the majority for its inconsistency:

. the undertones of the opinion, advocating complete and
uncompromising separation of Church from State, seem utterly
discordant with its conclusion yielding support to their
commingling in educational matters. The case which irresistibly
comes to mind as the most fitting precedent is that of Julia who,
according to Byron's reports, "whispering 'I will ne'er
consent, '--consented" (330 U. S. 1, 19).
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He expressed sympathy with the position of parents who send their
children to parochial schools, yet must continue to support public
schools, and noted that that the law in question was defective in the
first place because it unfairly singled out parochial school pupils for
reimbursement without providing for children who attended other private
religious or secular schools.

"If we are to decide this case on the

facts before us," he wrote, ''our question is simply this: Is it
constitutional to tax this complainant to pay the cost of carrying
pupils to Church schools of one specified denomination" (330 U.S. 1,
21 )?

But he concluded that such aid would be impermissible even if it

were distributed equitably, because the establishment clause guarantees
freedom against taxation for sectarian purposes.

He asserted that tax

aid to church schools is indistinguishable from rendering such aid
directly to the church.
In the course of this argument, Justice Jackson made an observation
which has yet to be pursued further by the Court:
Our public school, if not a product of Protestantism, at least is
more consistent with it than with the Catholic culture and scheme
of values. It is a relatively recent development dating from about
1840. It is organized on the premise that secular education can be
isolated from all religious teaching so that the school can
inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and also maintain a strict
and lofty neutrality as to religion. The assumption is that after
the individual has been instructed in worldly wisdom he will be
better fitted to choose his religion. Whether such a disjunction
is possible, and if possible whether it is wise, are questions I
need not try to answer (330 U.S. 1, 23-24).
This is an important admission and one that merits serious examination.
But he ruled out any solution that involved aid in any form with the
argument that the business of the government is to serve all citizens
equally rather than to single out specific groups for special treatment.
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He then added that the First Amendment "was intended not only to keep
the states' hands out of religion, but to keep religion's hands off the
state, and above all, to keep bitter religious controversy out of public
life by denying to every denomination any advantage from getting control
of public policy or the public purse" (330 U.S. 1, 26-27).

He capped

his dissent by arguing that aid from tax funds carries political
controls with it, citing his earlier opinion in Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111, 131 (1942): "'It is hardly lack of due process for the
Government to regulate that which it subsidizes.'" (330 U.S. 1, 28).
A second dissenting opinion was written by Justice Rutledge and
joined by Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Harold Burton.

8

Of the

three opinions, this was the strictest in its formulation of the
separationist theory.

It was also the least reticent in confronting the

dilemmas posed by the religion clauses and implications of separation.
Justice Rutledge first of all maintained that the two clauses must be
interpreted together since they are linked by their common reference to
religion.

Relying on James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, he

argued that not even a small tax can be imposed in support of religion.
Believing that transportation is "so indispensable an item from the
composite of total costs," he was unable to accept the argument that
reimbursement for transportation would not materially aid the
propagation of religious beliefs.

He also rejected justifications based

on public welfare and child safety that ignored the religious factor.
He explicitly equated the support of religion with purely private ends.
He acknowledged that various faiths avow "that the secular cannot
be and should not be separated from the religious phase and emphasis"
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and was not unappreciative of the financial burden that was placed on
parents who "desire a different kind of training others do not demand"
(330 U.S. 1, 46, 58).
he wrote.

"Hardship in fact there is which none can blink,"

"But, for assuring to those who undergo it the greater, the

most comprehensive freedom, it is one written by design and firm intent
into our law" (330 U.S. 1, 58).

He denied, however, that this burden

was discriminatory in the legal sense:
Were he to accept the common school, he would be the first to
protest the teaching there of any creed or faith not his own. And
it is precisely for the reason that their atmosphere is wholly
secular that children are not sent to public schools under the
Pierce doctrine. But that is a constitutional necessity, because
we have staked the very existence of our country on the faith that
complete separation between the state and religion is best for the
state and best for religion (330 U.S. 1, 59).
This position was as unsatisfactory for some groups, including a
few that acknowledged the hazards of accepting government money, as the
Court's ruling was unsatisfactory for others.
grips with the issue raised by Justice Jackson.
religion be truly separated?

Neither side came to
Can education and

Is secular education neutral with respect

to religion or does it tend to take the place of religion? 9

Are the

public schools, as one critic claims, a means of "compelling belief? 1110
But later cases involving religious exercises in the classroom and
financial aid to private schools have occasionally grazed the surface of
these questions.
Nearly twenty years passed before the Supreme Court again
confronted the problem.

But once it did, the Court's lack of a

consistent doctrine compounded its difficulty in balancing the
apparently competing claims of the establishment and free exercise
precedents.
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Released Time
The controversy over the meaning of the establishment clause became
far more intense when the Supreme Court took its first firm
separationist stance the following year in McCollum v. Board of
Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).

Like the famous Scopes trial of a

generation earlier, the issues and parties involved could not have been
better calculated to catalyze a public outcry.

The appellant, Vashti

McCollum, had originally sought a writ of mandamus to prohibit religious
instruction in public school classrooms during regular school hours, a
practice that is known as released time.

The case attracted particular

notoriety because the complaint was brought by an avowed atheist.

11

The

school board of Champaign, Illinois challenged her standing to sue.
Once again, Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court.
After denying the state's motion to dismiss, he reviewed the facts of
the case and commented on the close cooperation between school
authorities and the religious council in promoting religious education:
The operation of the state's compulsory education system thus
asists and is integrated with the program of religious instruction
carried on by the separate religious sects. Pupils compelled by
law to go to school for secular education are released in part
from their legal duty upon the condition that they attend the
religious classes. This is beyond all question a utilization of
the tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups to
spread their faith (333 U.S. 203, 209-10).
Reaffirming the separationist views expressed in the Everson opinions,
he rejected the school board's contention that "historically the First
Amendment was intended to forbid only government preference of one
religion over another, not an impartial governmental assistance of all
religions" (333 U.S. 203, 211 ).

He also denied that the Court was
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manifesting hostility to religion and urged that "the First Amendment
rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best work
to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within
its respective sphere" (333 U.S. 203, 212).
In a separate concurring opinion that spoke for the Everson
dissenters, Justice Frankfurter remarked that "agreement, in the
abstract, that the First Amendment was designed to erect a 'wall of
separation between Church and State,' does not preclude a clash of views
as to what the wall separates" (333 U.S. 203, 213).

He paid particular

attention to the historical roots and ideological underpinnings of the
popular education movement:
The secular public school did not imply indifference to the basic
role of religion in the life of the people, nor rejection of
religious education as a means of fostering it. The claims of
religion were not minimized by refusing to make the public schools
agencies for their assertion. The non-sectarian or public school
was the means of reconciling freedom in general with religious
freedom. The sharp confinement of the public schools to secular
education was a recognition of the need of a democratic society to
educate its children, insofar as the State undertook to do so, in
an atmosphere free from pressures in a realm where pressures are
most resisted and where conflicts are most easily and most bitterly
engendered. Designed to serve as a perhaps the most powerful
agency for promoting cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic
people, the public schools must keep scrupulously free from
entanglement in the strife of sects. The preservation of the
community from divisive conflicts, of Government from
irreconcilable pressures by religious groups, of religion from
censorship and coercion however subtly exercised, requires strict
confinement of the State to instruction other than religious,
leaving to the individual's church and home, indoctrination in the
faith of his choice (333 U.S. 203, 216-17).
Justice Frankfurter called attention to the Blaine Amendment and
the requirement by Congress in 1876 that every state admitted to the
union thereafter maintain school systems free of sectarian control.
then sketched the considerations that prompted efforts by religious

He
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groups first to seek financial relief for their schools and eventually
to request released time programs in public schools so that the schools
would not monopolize the children's time.

He noted that the first such

program was started in Gary, Indiana in 1914.

But he emphasized that

the concept of released time was not at issue in this case, only the
part played by public schools in executing a particular released time
program.

He held out a possible alternative by contrasting the

Champaign

progra~

with the French practice of "'dismissed time,' whereby

one school day is shortened to allow all children to go where they
please, leaving those who so desire to go to a religious school" (333

u.s.

203, 230).
Justice Jackson's concurring opinion shows that he was troubled by

the potential constitutional damage that could be wrought by the Court's
blanket assertion of the incorporation theory:
I think it is doubtful whether
juridiction in this Court, but
some bounds on the demands for
we are empowered or willing to

the facts of this case establish
in any event . . . we should place
interference with local schools that
entertain (333 U. S. 203, 232).

He warned that if the Court did not circumscribe its jurisdiction with
care it could expect to be continually drawn into this kind of local
controversy.

He considered the relief demanded in this case to be

extraordinary and observed that the representatives of any of the 256
substantial religious bodies in the country had as good a right to
demand relief:
If we are to eliminate everything that is objectionable to any of
these warring sects or inconsistent with any of their doctrines, we
will leave public education in shreds. Nothing but educational
confusion and a discrediting of the public school system can result
from subjecting it to constant law suits (333 U.S. 203, 235).
Justice Jackson further noted that "nearly everything in our
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culture worth transmitting, everything which gives meaning to life, is
saturated with religious influences . . . " (333 U.S. 203, 236).

Thus,

although he agreed that formal and explicit religious instruction like
that under the Champaign plan must be ended, he also believed that as a
rule local authorities must be left enough flexibility to deal with
local conditions.

He concluded that the Court's reach was exceeding its

grasp:
It is idle to pretend that this task is one for which we can find
in the Constitution one word to help us as judges to decide where
the secular ends and the sectarian begins in education. Nor can we
find guidance in any other legal source. It is a matter on which
we can find no law but our own prepossessions. If with no surer
legal guidance we are to take up and decide every variation of this
controversy, raised by persons not subject to penalty or tax but
who are dissatisfied with the way schools are dealing with the
problem, we are likely to have much business of the sort. And,
more importantly, we are likely to make the legal "wall of
separation between church and state" as winding as the famous
serpentine wall designed by Mr. 1 ~efferson for the University he
founded (333 U.S. 203, 237-38).
Justice Reed, the lone dissenter, reflected similar suspicions:

"

. . future cases must run the gantlet not only of the judgment

entered but of the accompanying words of the opinions.

I find it

difficult to extract from the opinions any conclusion as to what it is
in the Champaign plan that is unconstitutional" (333 U.S. 203, 240).
Many critics of the decision were similarly perplexed, like the
editorialist for the American Bar Association Journal, who found in the
Scriptures the very genesis of freedom and--referring to the Soviet
Constitution--remarked: "Nothing in our Constitution commands that
13
' freedom o f re 1 igion ' s h a 11 b e f ree d om f rom re 1 lglon.
. .
"
But with the exception of the McCollum decision, the Court's
rulings upheld the traditional accommodationist pattern in establishment
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cases until the famous school prayer and Bible reading decisions of the
early 1960s.

In fact, the Court declined to accept jurisdiction in the

first Bible reading case brought before it.

Justice Jackson, writing

for the majority in Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952),
found that the parents involved in the suit had not shown any direct
financial interest or injury.

Only Justices Douglas, Reed, and Burton

dissented.
Later that term, Justice Douglas temporarily left the separationist
ranks to render an opinion upholding another variety of released time in
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952).

Justice Douglas overlooked

Justice Black's argument that public schoolchildren were a captive
audience but repeated his remark that the Constitution does not support
a philosophy of hostility to religion, then added:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being. . . . When the state encourages religious instruction or
cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of
public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our
traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our
people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual
needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the
Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous
indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring those
who believe in no religion over those who do believe (343 U. S.
306f 313-14).
But it is difficult to find a significant difference between this
program and the one rejected in the McCollum case.
true form of dismissed time.

It was not even a

But since it did not require the use of

public school facilities, the law was easier to view favorably since it
clearly excluded religious classes from the building.
In his dissent, Justice Black reiterated his earlier position that
the state was using its coercive power to benefit religious sects.

He
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The Incorporation Theory
The Court's break with a longstanding tradition of civil religion
stirred considerable controversy from many sides of the issue.

In his

essay, "The Court as a National School Board," Edward Corwin blasted the
McCollum decision and the earlier Everson dissent by Justice Wiley
Rutledge.

He took particular exception to the Court's reading of

history: "All in all, it is fairly evident that Justice Rutledge sold
his brethren a bill of goods when he persuaded them that the
"establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment was intended
to rule out all governmental 'aid to all religions.

r

16

Then, commenting

on Justice Felix Frankfurter's supplemental opinion in the McCollum
case, Corwin noted: "· . . the opinion is a well-documented sketch of
the secularization of public school education in the United States a
reform effected--so far as it has been effected--purely by the political
process, unaided up to this point by the Supreme Court."

17

Specifically, he was referring to Horace Mann's opposition to
sectarianism, adding that Mann himself would have denied he was opposed
to religious instruction in the schools.

18

Much of the scholarly controversy centered around Justice Black's
incorporation argument, which was most fully developed in his dissenting
opinion in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1948).

Corwin

himself considered the incorporation theory defective, noting that the
Court rejected it as late as 1922 in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Cheek,
259 U.S. 530, 534), and addressed himself to the congressional debates
over the Fourteenth Amendment as an illustration:
That the Fourteenth Amendment would make the Bill of Rights
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also raised the issue of "political divisiveness" with his comment that
"State help to religion injects political and party prejudices into a
holy field" (343 U.S. 306, 320).

Replying directly to majority

opinion, he emphasized that the separation of church and state is
constitutionally mandated because Americans are a religious people.
Justice Jackson's pithy reply was even more to the point:
My evangelistic brethren confuse an objection to compulsion with an
objection to religion. It is possible to hold a faith with enough
confidence to believe that what should be rendered to God does not
need to be decided and collected by Caesar.
The day that this country ceases to be free for irreligion it will
cease to be free for religion--except for the sect that can win
political power (343 U.S. 306, 234-25).
It might be added that the same coercive powers could be exercised
on behalf of irreligion or some more attractively labeled equivalent.
The complications Justice Jackson had foreseen were becoming inescapably
evident.

As he remarked at the end of his Zorach dissent:

The wall which the Court was professing to erect between Church and
State has become even more warped and twisted than I expected.
Today's judgment will be more interesting to students of psychology
and of the judicial processes than to students of constitutional
law (343 U. S. 306, 325).
Indeed, the frontiers between these fields of study have become so
confounded that the Court's incorporation of sociological and
psychological precepts into its decisions is now a commonplace.

14

The McCollum decision stood as an admittedly important but lonely
precedent until the Court again took up the issue of religion in public
schools a decade later, when it banned classroom prayer, prohibited
devotional Bible reading, and began formulating the establishment clause
tests.

15

But in the meantime, the Court extended its string of

accommodationist rulings through a series of Sunday law cases.
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applicable to the states was frequently asserted in the
congressional debates on the former, but this circumstance lends
little if any support to the holding in the McCollum case. For one
thing, the Court can hardly rely on it and at the same time reject
the conception of the "establishment of religion" clause which
prevailed in 1868. If history is to be folt~wed on the one point,
it cannot fairly be abandoned on the other.
Corwin indicated that the repeated introduction of the Blaine
Amendment down to 1929

"assumes, of course, that it was necessary in

order to fill a gap in the Constitution. 1120

But he also believed that

the Court had already set an appropriate precedent for handling free
exercise issues in its Pierce decision, when Justice McReynolds was able
to affirm the rights of parents and private schools without resorting to
incorporation or even to the First Amendment.

He concluded: "All in

all, it seems clear that the Court, by its decision in the McCollum
case, has itself promulgated a law prohibiting 'the free exercise' of
religion, contrary to the express prohibition of the First Amendment.

21

A year later, Charles Fairman attacked the incorporation theory in
a lengthy analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment debates and concluded
that, at the time, Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan was alone in
contending that the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporated the personal rights guarantees of the Bill of
Rights.
position.

In essence, this was the position taken up by Justice Black's
Fairman concluded that the historical record was

. l y agalns
.
t h.lm. 22
overw h e l mlng

Another critic, John Whitehead, believes that the author of the key
section--section 1--of the Fourteenth Amendment contradicted himself on
its meaning.

Representative John Bingham, a Republican from Ohio,

declared during a floor speech in 1871 that he had designed the proposal
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so that it would initate the language used in Article I, section 10 to
limit state powers.

He then claimed that the amendment's effect was to

incorporate the first eight amendments via the privileges and immunities
clause.

23

But during the original debates in 1866, he made a very

different pitch:
I ask the attention of the House to the further consideration that
the proposed amendment does not impose upon any State of the Union,
or any citizen of any State of the Union, any obligation which is
not now enjoi~4d upon them by the very letter of the
Constitution.
Then, a few months afterwards, he either modified or clarified his
original position:
Allow me, Mr. Speaker, in passing, to say that this amendment takes
from no State any right that ever pertained to it. No State ever
had the right, under the forms of law or otherwise, to deny to any
freeman the equal protection of the laws or to abridge the
privileges or immunities of any citizen of the Republic, although
many of 5hem have assumed and exercised the power, and that without
2
remedy.
This last remark may have been directed at the Court's decision in Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857), which undoubtedly convinced many
of the need for reform.

In addition, the amendment was designed to

enable the Civil Rights Act to be enforced.
But even if Bingham's later conclusion is granted, his
incorporation rationale apparently found little support at the time.
Bernard Schwartz has commented that
. . . if such was the intent of the draftsmen of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it was soon to be frustrated. As Professor Corwin once
put it, "Unique among the constitutional provisions, the privileges
and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment enjoys the
distinction of having been rendered a "practical nullity" by a
single decision of the ~gpreme Court rendered within five years
after its ratification.
He was referring specifically to the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36
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(1873), which represented an early instance of judicial activism.
More recently, Chester Antieau examined the records of the state
ratification debates and concluded that the states fully appreciated
that the amendment would greatly expand federal legislative and judicial
as well as reduce state powers.
among opponents.

27

This was certainly a common fear

But whether the legislatures that ratified the

amendment regarded its purpose and effect in this light is still
problematic.
A key consideration, however, has been largely overlooked in the
academic debate over whether Bingham's earlier higher law view, his
later incorporation theory, or some other interpretation should prevail.
This is the complex legal issue over the manner in which Congress and
the White House conducted themselves during this period.

The

impeachment of President Andrew Johnson and the excesses of the
Reconstruction well covered by the standard histories.

Largely

forgotten, however, is the story of the political tactics by which the
Fourteenth Amendment came to be ratified.
The issue of coercion was raised by a leading constitutional
scholar of the period, George Ticknor Curtis, who had earlier argued
before the Supreme Court on behalf of Dred Scott.

He noted that

Secretary of State William Seward proclaimed ratification on July 20,
1868 but cast doubt on its legality because the total vote included
ratifications by six de facto state legislatures.

By that time, Ohio

and New Jersey had also withdrawn their ratification, as did Oregon a
few months after Seward's announcement.

Curtis surveyed the whole

proceeding with evident displeasure and finally took an ambivalent view

361

as to its legality, observing only that
. . . when such a process of amendment is resorted to, it must
depend on future events whether an amendment, thus purporting to
have been adopted, is to be regarded as having become valid under
the principles of public law, which are deemed to cure
irregularities in and de~§rtures from the legal and constitutional
method of public action.
Felix Morley later attributed the Military Reconstruction Act of
1867 to a scheme by Thaddeus Stevens and his associates in Congress to
circumvent the negative ratification votes by the Southern states:
Although it was then almost two years since the complete collapse
of the Confederacy, this Act defined its States as "rebel,"
declared that "no legal State government" existed in that area,
placed these States under military rule, and added the blackmailing
provision that this tyranny would continue until new and compliant
legislatures "shall have adopted the Fourteenth Amendment." Only
thereafter would any recalcitrant Southern State "be declared
entitled to representation in Congress."
President Johnson promptly vetoed this "Reconstruction Act" as
completely and obviously unconstitutional and many suits against it
were brought in the courts. But the Radicals overrode the veto,
brought impeachment proceedings against the President "for high
crimes and misdemeanors" and further threatened impeachment of the
Supreme Court justices, who thereupon supinely bowed themselves out
of the picture on the curious reasoning (Georgia v. Stanton) that
the issues aroused by the Act were political and not justiciable.
They surely were political. The clear objective of Stevens was to
change the form of government into that of a parliamentary
democracy with the President--Senator Ben Wade was tapped to
succeed Johnson--wholly subordinate to a Congress in which the
Radicals would be a permanently dominant party. But if that
revolutionary design was not ~usticiable then there is no such
2
thing as constitutional law.
In view of this record, it is perhaps no cause for wonder that the
Court tended to ignore some of the more radical implications of the
amendment for many years afterwards.
The Sunday Law Cases
The cluster of Sunday law cases the Court decided on May 29, l96l
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brought the separationist and accommodationist positions--along with
free exercise and establishment clause expectations--to their first real
test in nearly a decade.

In four decisions that laid the groundwork for

the curious compromises and sometimes unpredictable rulings that
followed, the Court upheld Sunday closing laws as reasonable exercises
of the police power to achieve secular goals.
wrote the four opinions for the Court.

Chief Justice Earl Warren

Justice Douglas alone dissented

in all the cases.
The facts in three of the cases were similar.

The appellants, who

were owners or employees of stores in Maryland and Pennsylvania, were
convicted of violating state laws prohibiting the sale of merchandise on
Sunday.

In McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961 ), Chief Justice

Warren noted that, although the employees of a discount department store
challenged the law as an establishment of religion, they did not allege
that their free exercise rights had been violated.

Instead, they

claimed that they suffered direct economic injury "due to the imposition
on them of the tenets of the Christian religion.''

In a review of the

long history of Sunday closing laws in Europe and America, the Chief
Justice noted that their justification had been gradually secularized
and their connection with state religious establishments severed.

He

cited the previous Supreme Court cases and then noted that Virginia kept
its statute banning Sunday labor even after passage of its law of 1799
that established religious freedom.

In fact, James Madison sponsored a

bill punishing sabbath breakers which passed in 1785.
Although he conceded that some of the evidence indicated a
religious purpose, the Chief Justice believed that the law's secular
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purpose of providing a common day of rest for all citizens had long been
emphasized:
After engaging in the close scrutiny demanded of us when First
Amendment liberties are at issue, we accept the State Supreme
Court's determination that the statutes' present purpose and effect
is not to aid religion but to set aside a day of rest and
recreation (366 U.S. 420, 449).
He also contended that since the purpose of the law was not just to
provide a day of rest, but a common day, no less burdensome alternative
means were available to it.
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961 ),
involved the owners and patrons of a kosher grocery store in
Springfield, Massachusetts.

The owners, who strictly observed the

Jewish sabbath and dietary laws, kept the store closed from Friday
evening until Sunday morning but then conducted one-third of their
business for the week that day.

They contended that the exceptions to

the statute were so numerous and arbitrary that it lacked a rational
basis and had convinced a federal district court to enjoin enforcement
of the statute against them.

They also claimed it violated their

religious freedom.
After reviewing the exceptions, the Chief Justice argued that
simply "because the State wishes to protect those who do worship on
Sunday does not mean that the State means to impose religious worship on
all" (366 U.S. 617, 627).

But he concluded that the particular

exceptions indicated that ''the present scheme is one to provide an
atmosphere of recreation rather than religion," then cited several cases
that gave a religious character to the statute but did not indicate that
its purpose was exclusively religious.
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In Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582
(1961 ), the Court noted that the Pennsylvania legislators who backed the
most recently updated version of the law "specifically disavowed any
religious purpose for its enactment but stated instead that economics
required its passage" ( 366 U.S. 582, 595) .
The toughest of the four cases, Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1961 ), admittedly involved an extreme financial hardship.

The

appellants, all of whom were Orthodox Jewish merchants in Philadephia,
claimed that the Sunday closing law impaired their ability to earn a
livelihood.

One claimed he would be unable to stay in business, thereby

losing his capital investment.

But the Court upheld the statute and

cited the belief-action dichtomy of the Cantwell rule.

Arguing in much

the way that Justice Frankfurter did in the McCollum case, Chief Justice
Warren suggested that
. . the Sunday law simply regulates a secular activity and, as
applied to appellants, operates so as to make the practice of their
religious beliefs more expensive. Furthermore, the law's effect
does not inconvenience all members of the Orthodox Jewish faith but
only those who believe it necessary to work on Sunday. And even
these are not faced with as serious a choice as forsaking their
religious practices or subjecting themselves to criminal
prosecution (366 U.S. 599, 606).
He also indicated that if the shoe were on the other foot, these
merchants would enjoy a competitive advantage over those who observed
Sunday as a day of rest.

He concluded that this fact might lead some to

claim religious exemptions on spurious grounds, necessitating a
state-conducted inquiry into their sincerity that he believed would
violate the spirit of the constitution.
Justices Brennan and Stewart dissented in the Gallagher and
Braunfeld cases but their opinions only concerned the latter.

Justice
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Brennan failed to see either a grave and immediate danger or a
compelling state interest that would dictating enforcing an economic
hardship on Orthodox Jewish merchants.

He mentioned several states that

permitted exceptions which covered this case and remarked that the
difficulties the Court "conjures up . . . seem to me more fanciful than
real."

Justice Stewart was more succinct:

Pennsylvania has passed a law which compels an Orthodox Jew to
choose between his religious faith and his economic survival. That
is a cruel choice. It is a choice which I think no State can
constitutionally demand. For me this is not something that can be
swept under the rug and forgotten in the interest of enforced
Sunday togetherness. I think the impact of this law upon these
appellants grossly violates their constitutional right to the free
exercise of religion (366 U.S. 599, 616).
Justice Frankfurter, who was joined by Justice John Harlan, wrote a
separate concurring opinion covering 100 pages, largely composed of a
study of the history of Sunday laws.

He noted that only Alaska lacked

some variety of Sunday legislation and rejected the arguments, then
rejected the various grounds given by the appellants with voluminous
citations from statutory and case law.
But Justice Douglas would have none of this.

For him, the

religious factor was decisive and he contended that the statutes were an
unconstitutional establishment of religion.

He did not confine his

dissent to this issue, however, and strung together a series of
observations, including some that were reminiscent of his Zorach
opinion: "The institutions of our society are founded on the belief that
there is an authority higher than the authority of the State; that there
is a moral law which the state is powerless to alter; that the
individual possesses rights, conferred by the Creator, which government
must respect" (366 U.S. 420, 562).

He lauded the Puritan contribution
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to constitutional law but emphasized that the First Amendment was
designed to prevent coercive measures by government and remarked that
"if a religious leaven is to be worked into the affairs of our people,
it is to be done by individuals and groups, not by the Government."
Like the majority, he reviewed the history of Sunday legislation but
based his dissent on the California Supreme Court's opinion in Ex parte
Newman, 9 Cal. 502, 509 (1858): "'The truth is, however much it may be
disguised, that this one day of rest is a purely religious idea'" (366
U.S. 420, 570).

He believed that the Court's rulings in these cases had

the effect of bringing religious minorities "to heel because the
minority, in the doing of acts which intrinsically wholesome and not
antisocial, does not defer to the majority's religious beliefs" (366

u.s.

420, 575).
Justice Douglas repeated his views the following year when a

criminal case, Arlan's Department Store v. Kentucky, 371 U.S. 218
(1962), came to the Court on appeal and was dismissed for want of a
substantial federal question.
The significance of these cases is perhaps best appreciated in
light of the school cases that both preceded and followed them.

Even

though the Court determined that these laws had the secular purpose of
promoting a common day of rest, it did not blink at the long historical
association of Sunday laws with established religion.

It simply

asserted--in so many words--that the practice had been secularized.
it did not address the question whether, in fact, an establishment of
sorts remained and it failed to come to grips with Justice Douglas'
observation that it favored a religious majority.

The majority had

But
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history on its side.

The dissenters relied on the logic of the Court's

earlier separationist rhetoric.
What may not be so evident, however, is the consistency of these
rulings with those in several of the school cases.

The financial

burdens placed on these merchants was probably not greater than those
borne by private religious schools and the families whose children
attend them.

Justices Jackson and Rutledge had earlier addressed this

problem but failed to resolve it.

Indeed, the Court has tended to

overlook such simple economic arithmetic in its calculus of First
Amendment requirements.

Even so, when it overruled Nebraska and Oregon

in the early private school cases, it was armed only with the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Perhaps the difference is

that the Court was not sidetracked then by "a clash of views as to what
the wall separates" and stuck to fundamentals, such as the rights to
personal liberty and property.
The remnants of state religion were proving more intractable than
the metaphor of a high and impregnable wall would indicate.

It wa:s not

only a "warped and twisted" wall but, as Roger Williams had recognized,
a broken one.

Yet even the strictest separationists were unwilling to

say that there could be no commerce over, under, or through the wall.
It may be that, as Robert Frost said so simply, there is something that
does not like a wall.

Perhaps, indeed, "all law is an establishment of

religion" in the extended and possibly more practical sense the Court
has been compelled to adopt in light of its separationist logic.

The

nature of that establishment remains, as usual, one of the major bones
of political contention.
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Devotional Exercises
The controversy over the McCollum decision was, if anything,
exceeded by the public debate over back-to-back rulings that first of
all banned group prayers in public school classrooms and then devotional
Bible reading.

Although many states had by then prohibited such obvious

religious expressions, others considered them vital to maintaining a
proper atmosphere for learning.

Following these rulings, education

became the major battleground over competing judicial and religious
philosophies.

It has remained so ever since, as may be surmised by the

fact that prayer in public schools is still a political and judicial
issue in 1984.
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For the third time, Justice Black wrote for the Court in a key
establishment case.

In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), the Court

ruled that a prayer recommended by the New York Board of Regents--or any
prayer--may not be recited as a daily classroom exercise.

The parents

of ten pupils unsuccessfully challenged the practice in the state courts
and had been granted certiorari by the Supreme Court.
The famous Regents' Prayer, like many of its counterparts used
across the country, was short, simple, and considered nonsectarian:
"'Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy
blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country'" (370 U.S.
421, 422).

It was clearly theistic but not identifiable with any of the

several religions that claim the Bible as their source.

Justice Black,

however, characterized it as a violation of the establishment clause
"because that prayer was composed by governmental officials as a part of
a program to further religious beliefs."

He then turned to the history
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of officially-sponsored prayers, especially the controversy aroused by
the Book of Common Prayer used in the established, tax-supported Church
of England: "It is a matter of history that this very practice of
establishing governmentally composed prayers for religious services was
one of the reasons which caused many of our early colonists to leave
England and seek religious freedom in America 11 (370 U.S. 421, 425).
It was for the sake of such matters of personal and corporate
conscience that the founders were led to seek constitutional guarantees
that would not be influenced by the ballot box.

Justice Black concluded

that the purposes behind the establishment clause went far beyond those
of the free exercise clause:
Although these two clauses may in certain instances overlap, they
forbid two quite different kinds of governmental encroachment upon
religious freedom. The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free
Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct
governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws
which establish an official religion whether those laws operate
directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not. . . . Its first
and most immediate purpose rested on the belief that a union of
government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade
religion. The history of governmentally established religion, both
in England and in this country, showed that whenever government had
allied itself with one particular form of religion, the inevitable
result had been that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect and
even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs. That same
history showed that many people had lost their respect for any
religion that had relied upon the support of government to spread
its faith. The Establishment Clause thus stands as an expression
of principle on the part of the Founders of our Constitution that
religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its
'unhallowed perversion' by a civil magistrate. Another purpose of
the Establishment Clause rested upon an awareness of the historical
fact that governmentally established religions and religious
persecutions go hand in hand (370 U.S. 430, 431-32).
In light of history, however, it is clear that many of the American
founders would not have granted that the office of the civil magistrate
must somehow be detached from all religious duties to preserve its
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secular character.

One of the distinctive ideas of the Protestant

reformers was the "priesthood of all believers," in which even civil
offices were treated as religious callings.

If it is true, as Orestes

Brownson asserted in the nineteenth century, that in the long run this
doctrine was creating a general disregard for all authority--a point
that may be argued--it is not evident that the founders were any less
committed to their religious profession than those who sought to retain
a legal and financial ties between church and state.

But Justice Black

correctly identified the compulsory and corrupting nature of this tie as
the problem the founders attempted to resolve by constitutional means.
He reaffirmed the Court's position that its separationist position did
not indicate any hostility to religion:
Nothing, of
inseparable
too much to
people have
prayer than

course, could be more wrong. The history of man is
from the history of religion. And perhaps it is not
say that since the beginning of that history many
devoutly believed that "More things are wrought by
this world dreams of" (370 U.S. 421, 434).

Justice Douglas concurred but hinted that the Court was
inconsistent in not similarly challenging the chaplaincy.

He believed

that every audience, whether adults in Congress or children in the
public schools, is a captive audience.

Once again, he appealed to logic

while the Court appealed to history and contended that the Everson
decision, which he had supported, was "out of line with the First
Amendment."
Only Justice Stewart dissented.

He emphasized the voluntary aspect

of the prayer and did not equate this issue with the establishment of a
state church.

He was concern about the logical implications of the

ruling, believing it called into question such familiar expressions of
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civil religion as the national anthem, the pledge of allegiance, and the
inscription of "In God We Trust" on coins.
The Court let the other shoe fall the next year when it banned
devotional Bible reading from public school classrooms in School
District of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).

Much of the

controversy focused on its companion case, Murray v. Curlett, which
involved Madalyn Murray--who subsequently became the most highly
publicized atheist since Colonel Robert Ingersoll--and her argument that
the practice placed a premium on belief as opposed to unbelief.

The

members of the Schempp family, who were Unitarians, objected to
"specific religious doctrines purveyed by a literal reading of the Bible
'which were contrary to the religious beliefs which they held and to
their familial teaching'" (374 U.S. 203, 208).

The unacknowledged issue

in this case was the view that "Christianity is part of the common law
of Pennsylvania," which had been reiterated by the courts in a number of
cases up until that time.

The defense called as an expert witness Dr.

Luther Weigle, who contended that the Bible is nonsectarian.
After reviewing the particulars, Justice Clark noted the close
identification of religion with American history and government, but
then added that religious freedom is just as "strongly imbeded in our
public and private life."

The heart of his opinion was his concept that

government must maintain strict neutrality with respect to religion in
order to prevent "a fusion of governmental and religious functions or a
concert or dependency of one upon the other . . . " (374 U.S. 203, 222).
Justice Douglas concurred and mentioned the use of compulsory religious
exercises in "state-church countries" like Spain.

He emphasized that
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the most effective way to establish a religion is to finance its
schools.
Justice Brennan wrote a concurring opinion that rivaled in length
the opinion by Justice Frankfurter in the Sunday law cases, most of
which was devoted to an analysis of the constitutional and judicial
history of the religion clauses, followed by a review of the history of
public education.

He took up a problem that had earlier been addressed

by Justice Jackson:
The fact is that the line which separates the secular from the
sectarian in American life is elusive. The difficulty of defining
the boundary with precision inheres in a paradox central to our
scheme of liberty. While our institutions reflect a firm
conviction that we are a religious people, those institutions by
solemn constitutional injunction may not officially involve
religion in such a way as to prefer, discriminate against, or
oppress, a particular sect or religion. Equally the Constitution
enjoins those involvements of religious with secular institutions
which (a) serve the essentially religious activities of religious
institutions; (b) employ the organs of government for essentially
religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to serve
governmental ends where secular means would suffice (374 U.S. 203,
231).
He rejected arguments that daily prayer and Bible reading were
justified because they served a secular purpose.

He did not question

their positive value but concluded that "the State acts
unconstitutionally if it either sets about to attain even indirectly
religious ends by religious means, or if it uses religious means to
serve secular ends where secular means would suffice" (374 U.S. 203,
281 ).

He further stated there "are persons in every co!limunity--often

deeply devout--to whom any version of the Judaeo-Christian Bible is
offensive" and he contrasted various sectarian attitudes toward public
prayers.

But even if students were excused from these exercises, he

considered the fact that they were religious "altogether dispositive."
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At last, he turned to several additional questions on the basis of
a standard of neutrality, defending the employment of military and
prison chaplains, religious exercises in legislative bodies,
non-devotional uses of the Bible, uniform tax exemptions that
incidentally benefit religious organizations, religious considerations
in such public welfare programs as unemployment compensation, and
activities he believed had lost their religious significance.

He

mentioned, for example, that "it would be impossible to teach
meaningfully many subjects in the social sciences or humanities without
some mention of religion" (374 U.S. 203, 300). 31
Justice Stewart again was the lone dissenter and stated that he
considered the measures as being designed to make possible the free
exercise of religion.

He compared the practice to the provision of

military chaplains for soldiers stationed at faraway outposts.

The

issue, he believed, turned on the question of coercion, allegations of
which were absent from the record.
A particular doctrinal tenet became the central issue five years
later in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), when the Court voided
a statute that made it unlawful to "'teach the theory or doctrine that
mankind descended from a lower order of animals"' in any state-supported
school.

Justice Abe Fortas, who spoke for the Court, declined to

overrule the law on the vaguenes issue that had been raised and instead
that it must be stricken because, he believed, the sole reason for the
law was to proscribe a particular segment of the body of knowledge
"deemed to conflict with a particular religious doctrine; that is, with
a particular interpretation of the Book of Genesis by a particular
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group" (393 U.S. 97, 103).
Justice Black, who concurred with the ruling, said he was "by no
means sure that this case presents a genuinely justiciable case or
controversy."

He pointed out that the law had nslumbered on the books

as though deadn for nearly forty years.

What particularly troubled him

was the way the Court chose to intrude ninto state powers to decide what
subjects and schoolbooks it may wish to use in teaching state pupilsn
(393 U.S. 97, 111 ).

He believed that the state's motive was probably

simply to remove a controversial subject from its schools and saw no
reason vJhy it may not do so.

Regarding this subject, he added: "If the

theory is considered anti-religious, as the Court indicates, how can the
State be bound by the Federal Constitution to permit its teachers to
advocate such an 'anti-religious' doctrine to schoolchildren'" (393 U.S.
97, 113)?

Justices Harlan and Stewart also wrote separate concurring

opinions.
The issue raised by Justice Black points up one of the dilemmas
involved in the Court's strict separationist position on the
establishment clause.

The conclusion that public schools cannot be

permitted to teach doctrines that offend particular religious beliefs is
simply the other side of the coin that does not permit the state to
establish a religious doctrine.

The establishment implications are

inescapable.
The issue has by no means disappeared.

An altogether different

tack has been taken more recently that would require equal time for
creationist and evolution theories about human origins.

This approach

would altogether fail to meet Justice Black's separationist standard but
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it does seem to reflect the logic by which the Court has chosen to
balance competing separationist and accommodationist considerations.
The consequences may be readily seen in the doctrinal inconsistencies
that have led to contradictory results in the lower courts.

32

Such are

the dilemmas into which the judiciary has fallen in an attempt to
reconcile what are seen as competing First Amendment values within the
framework of an established public education system.
Tension Between the Clauses
Many commentators, including members of the Court, have expressed
regret over the years at what they perceive as a tension between the
religion clauses.

Part of this tension may be due to the clash of

competing doctrinal assumptions.

Philip Kurland has favored Justice

Frankfurter's view that the two religion clauses of the First Amendment
bl e. 33
.
are lnsepara

Similarly, Justice Rutledge maintained that both

clauses were linked by their common reference to religion.

Others,

however, have treated the clauses as if they make distinct, even
unrelated, demands.
But part of the tension may be due to the nature of the legal
structure and the competing economic, educational, and social goals that
are pursued by legislative and bureaucratic means.

The courts have been

increasingly called upon to harmonize conflicts over the distribution of
governmental largesse, the pursuit of educational quality, and the
regulation of social behavior.

The coincidence of so many rulings with

identifiable political and ideological positions is so evident that it
brings to mind Justice Jackson's remark that "we can find no law but our
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prepossessions. 11
The most comprehensive judicial treatment of this alleged tension
may be found in the dissenting opinion written by Justice William
Rehnquist in Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security
Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981 ).

He attributed this tension to three

causes:
First, the growth of social welfare legislation during the latter
part of the 20th century has greatly magnified the potential for
conflict between the two Clauses, since such legislation touches
the individual at so many points in his life. Second, the decision
by this Court that the First Amendment was 11 incorporated 11 into the
Fourteenth Amendment and thereby made applicable against the States
. . . similarly multiplied the number of instances in which this
''tension 11 might arise. The third, and perhaps most important,
cause of the tension is our overly expansive interpretation of both
Clauses. By broadly construing both Clauses, the Court has
---constantly narrowed the channel between the Scylla and Charybdis
through which any state or federal action must pass in order to
survive constitutional scrutiny (450 U.S. 707, 721).
He contended that those who framed and adopted the First Amendment could
not have foreseen such applications of the religion clauses

11

at a time ·

when the Federal Government was in a real sense considered a government
of limited delegated powers. 11
If anything, the divisions within the Court have been intensified
during the last decade.

Unanimous decisions on religious issues are

virtually a thing of the past.

Shifting alliances have led to

conflicting decisions that could more easily be attributed to a throw of
the dice than to the operation of a particular set of doctrinal
standards.

Outcomes have sometimes turned on the interpretation of a

single word in a statue or lower court dictum.

Perhaps most

characteristic of all have been the cases involving private school aid,
which yielded such variant results in the course of a decade as to lead
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an exasperated Justice John Paul Stevens to conclude they had been
decided on an ad hoc basis.

Amidst a tangled web of doctrine, the

Court's role as an advocate appears to be taking an inward turn as the
justices seek to find a ground upon which they might stand together.
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